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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Is the Court of Appeals' construction of the parties'

stock purchase option contract in conflict with this Court's
ruling in Davies v. Semloh Hotel, 86 Utah 318, 44 P.2d 689 (1935),
and Taylor v. Paynes, 118 Utah 72, 218 P.2d 1069 (1950)?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals err in construing the nature

of the contract the parties intended to create?
3. After notice of R.O.A.'s exercise of the purchase
option on January 27, 1987, did plaintiff Webb retain his right of
inspection under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(d)?
4.

Did the Court of Appeals err in awarding plaintiff

Webb multiple statutory penalties under Utah Code Ann.
§16-10-47(c)?
COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is published at
Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 106 Utah Adv.Rep. 47 (Utah Ct.App.
1989).

See Addendum, A-2 to A-7.)
JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on April

11, 1989. A 30-day extension of time within which to petition for
certiorari was granted and entered by this Court on May 1, 1989.
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1988)

Confers jurisdiction on

this Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision by a writ of
certiorari.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY
OR OTHER AUTHORITIES
The text of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-2(15) and §16-10-47(b)
and (c) are set forth in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an issue of first impression in Utah
concerning the relationship between a corporation and its
stockholders.

This appeal arises from an action by plaintiff to

compel defendants R.O.A. and Reagan to produce the corporate books
and records of R.O.A. pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b)
(1953).

Plaintiff also seeks to recover statutory penalties under

Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1953) for defendants1 alleged multiple wrongful refusals to allow such examinations.
Plaintiff and his wife, Bessie Webb, formerly owned stock
in R.O.A. as joint tenants.

(R. at 2, 80, 84, 89, 90, 130, 517)

On July 7, 1981, plaintiff and Bessie Webb (hereinafter the
"Webbs"), and William Reagan (hereinafter "Reagan"), executed a
written agreement (hereinafter the "Agreement"), forming R.O.A., a
Utah corporation.

(R. at 62-78)

Pursuant to the Agreement, Reagan

obtained 80% of the stock of R.O.A. and the Webbs acquired the
balance of the stock.

(R. at 34, 203, 274)

Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Agreement, R.O.A. had the
right to purchase all of the Webbs' stock.

(R. at 71-72)

In order

to exercise such right, R.O.A. was only required to provide notice
of the purchase within 6 months after August 1, 1986.

(R. at 71-72)

Pursuant to the Agreement, the purchase price of the Webbs' stock
was to be determined by an independent appraisal.
R7
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(R. at 62-78)

The terms of payment for the Webbs1 stock were also determined in
the Agreement,

(R. at 71-74)

Following notice of R.O.A.fs elec-

tion to purchase their stock, the Webbs were contractually
required to begin the appraisal process.

(R. at 72)

Plaintiff served as a director of R.O.A. beginning on
August 1, 1981.

(R. at 35, 80)

During the period of his

employment as a director of R.O.A. and for so long as the Webbs
were stockholders, plaintiff maintained an office at R.O.A.!s
corporate headquarters and had access to the books and records of
R.O.A.

Plaintiff, in fact, periodically reviewed R.O.A.'s books

and records.

(R. at 158, 178-81, 287)

On or about March 5, 1985, plaintiff, by and through his
accountant, Duane E. Karren, made demand upon R.O.A. to formally
inspect its corporate books and records.

(R. at 190-94)

Pursuant

to the Webbs' request, R.O.A. made its books and records available
for inspection.
and records.

Mr. Karren subsequently inspected R.O.A.fs books

(R. at 191)

By letter dated January 27, 1987, R.O.A. gave notice to
plaintiff of its exercise of its purchase option.

(R. at 43, 78A,

207, 280, 484, 508)
On April 20, 1987, plaintiff informed R.O.A. and Reagan
that he intended to exercise his statutory right to inspect the
books and records of R.O.A.

(R. at 53, 485)

The demand did not

state the purpose of the proposed examination.

(R. at 53)

Plaintiff's April 20 demand was received at R.O.A.
headquarters while Reagan was out of the country.
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R.O.A. informed

plaintiff that Reagan would be out of the country until May 18,
1987.

R.O.A. requested that plaintiff renew his demand once Reagan

returned.

(R. at 54, 485) R.O.A. also informed plaintiff that

recent personnel changes in R.O.A.'s accounting department would
make such an inspection extremely difficult for R.O.A. to respond
to immediately.

R.O.A. also indicated that plaintiff would need to

clarify his demand in order to facilitate production of the desired
records.

(R. at 54)
Plaintiff's accountant, Mr. Karren, on or about May 18,

1987, identified the records he sought to inspect.

The May 18

letter indicated that the desired examination was to be substantially similar to Mr. Karren's prior examination of R.O.A.'s
records.

(R. at 55-56)

The letter did not set a date for exami-

nation of the records.
Much of the information requested in the May 18 letter
required R.O.A. to expend considerable time and effort to comply
with the request.

Plaintiff's May 18 request required defendant to

do far more than simply open its books for inspection.

Plaintiff

specifically demanded that R.O.A. assemble various summaries and
explanations of certain business transactions.

(R. at 55-56)

On May 20, 1987, plaintiff made demand upon R.O.A. through
a new agent, Attorney Victoria E. Brieant.

The May 20 demand

stated that Attorney Brieant and others would be present at 10:00
a.m. on May 27, 1987, at the offices of R.O.A. to examine the
corporate records.

(R. at 57, 93)

Plaintiff made no effort to

arrange a mutually convenient time to conduct the investigation.
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Attorney Brieant!s May 20 demand also indicated that she
intended to use "our accountants, Peat, Marwick & Mitchell • . . ."
Ms. Brieantfs demand also alluded to the need for an appraisal.
The demand did not specify, however, whether the requested
examination would be used in the appraisal of the Webbs' stock as
required under the Agreement.

(R. at 57)

Defendants R.O.A. and Reagan responded to plaintiff's
demand by requesting that R.O.A. be given sufficient time to prepare for the examination, that the examination be conducted in
accordance with the Agreement's appraisal process, that the
confidentiality of R.O.A.'s trade secrets and financial information be maintained, and lastly, that the inspection be done in an
orderly fashion so as to minimize disruption of R.O.A.'s ongoing
business.

(R. at 58, 94)
In May, 1987, Richard Brooks, a key employee in R.O.A.'s

accounting department, terminated his employment.

Mr. Brooks'

absence left R.O.A. shorthanded, thereby making it extremely
difficult for R.O.A. to promptly prepare the requested summaries
and reports.

(R. at 54, 178-81, 287)

On May 26, 1987, a letter was hand-delivered to
plaintiff's counsel from defendants' counsel, William H. Adams.
Mr. Adams explained that R.O.A.'s records would be made available
for examination by plaintiff or his agents in accordance with the
appraisal rights accorded plaintiff under the Agreement.

Adams

indicated that it would be unreasonable to expect R.O.A. to assume
the burden of multiple examinations by parties other than plaintiff's

designated appraiser.

(R. at 58)

Despite prior indications by plaintiff's counsel that a
Mr. Donald Sutte had been appointed to render an appraisal of the
value of the Webbs' stock, plaintiff's counsel and various other
individuals from Peat, Marwick & Mitchell arrived at R.O.A.
headquarters on the morning of May 27, 1987.
93, 94, 102)

(R. at 37, 38, 57,

While plaintiff's counsel was at R.O.A. corporate

headquarters, defendants' counsel notifed her that an inspection
of R.O.A.'s records would not be permitted on that date.

(R. at

37, 38, 93, 94, 102)
On May 29, 1987, plaintiff filed suit against defendants,
seeking damages from R.O.A. for alleged breach of an employment
contract.

In addition, plaintiff sought injunctive relief and

statutory damages against R.O.A., Reagan and others for their
alleged wrongful refusal to permit plaintiff to inspect the
corporate records of R.O.A.

(R. at 2-9)

On June 3, 1987, plaintiff once again made demand to
inspect the books and records of R.O.A.

(R. at 59-60)

Plaintiff's

counsel indicated that the inspection would take place beginning at
10:00 a.m. on June 5, 19 87.
By letter dated June 4, 1987, defendants' counsel advised
plaintiff's counsel that R.O.A. would make its employees available
to assist plaintiff's inspection beginning June 15, 1987.
61)

(R. at

Counsel was also informed that the inspection would take place

only upon the condition that the individuals examining the records
would be required to sign a confidentiality agreement prior to
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beginning their inspection.

(R. at 61)

On June 15, 1987, when plaintiff's attorney and several
unidentified persons appeared at the office of R.O.A., Ms. Brieant
refused to permit any of the parties to execute the confidentiality
agreement.

Ms. Brieant also refused to comply with the other

conditions R.O.A. had placed upon plaintiff's inspection of the
records as set forth in R.O.A.'s prior correspondence to plaintiff.
(R. at 288)

As a result, R.O.A. and Reagan declined to permit

Ms. Brieant and the others access to R.O.A.'s records.

(R. at 96)

On June 15, 1987, plaintiff filed his first Amended
Complaint, seeking additional statutory damages due to the refusal
of R.O.A. and Reagan "on three separate occasions" to permit
inspection of R.O.A.'s records.

(R. at 33-47)

One week after filing the Amended Complaint, plaintiff
moved for partial summary judgment.

(R. at 111-12)

motion was supported by various affidavits.

Plaintiff's

(R. at 89-97)

On

June 26, 1987, defendants R.O.A. and Reagan filed cross-motions for
partial summary judgment.

(R. at 128-29, 185-86) Defendants'

cross-motions for partial summary judgment were also supported by
various affidavits.

(R. at 156-58, 178-81)

On August 28, 1987, the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, The Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, denied
plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and granted
defendant's cross-motions for summary judgment.

(R. at 344-45)

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, and
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF IS A SHAREHOLDER UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN. §16-10-47 (1953).
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) (1953) codifies the common law
rule that a shareholder has the right to inspect corporate books
and records at a reasonable time and for a reasonable purpose. A
"shareholder" is further defined under Utah law as "one who is a
holder of record of shares in a corporation."

Utah Code Ann.

§16-10-2(15) (1953) .
R.O.A.'s purchase option constituted a continuing
irrevocable offer of sale by the Webbs which could not be withdrawn
during the stated period.
power of acceptance.

The purchase option vested in R.O.A. a

The Agreement contemplated that once R.O.A.

accepted the Webbs' offer, a binding bilateral contract of sale
would be created.

1A Corbin On Contracts §§259, 260, 264 (1963

ed.); 1 Williston On Contracts §§25, 61A-D (3d ed.); 17 Am.Jur.2d
Contracts §32 (1964); and 77 C.J.S. Sales §33(d) (1952).

See also,

Ollie v. Rainbolt, 669 P.2d 275, 279 (Okla. 1983) (noting the critical difference between a right of first refusal agreement and a
purchase option agreement).
By exercising its purchase option on January 27, 1987,
R.O.A. accepted the plaintiff's offer of sale, and bound the parties to perform.

1 Williston On Contracts §61B (3d ed.).

R.O.A.'s

exercise of its purchase option obligated plaintiff Webb to comply
with the Agreement by obtaining an appraisal and tendering his stock

to R.O.A.

See, Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life

Ins. Co., 148 Colo. 519, 367 P.2d 335 (1961).

In accordance with

the terms of the Agreement, R.O.A.'s exercise of the purchase
option divested plaintiff of his status as a shareholder on January
27, 1987. As a result, plaintiff had no statutory right to inspect
R.O.A.fs books and records any time thereafter.
A similar result was reached in In Re Gaines, 180 N.Y.S.
191 (1919), aff!d, 190 App.Div. 941, 179 N.Y.S. 922 (1920).

In

Gaines, plaintiff brought suit to examine certain corporate records.
Plaintiff instituted the action claiming that her deceased father
was a shareholder in the corporation, and that under his will she
was entitled to the stock.

The defendant corporation denied that

plaintiff was a shareholder on the ground that she had entered into
a binding contract to sell her interest in the stock.
The Gaines court, after noting that the plaintiff's contract to sell the stock was binding, concluded that the plaintiff
had no standing to inspect the corporate records.

IcL at 192.

Plaintiff has asserted on appeal that he must be deemed to
be a "shareholder," since he has not been paid for his stock.

The

Agreement does not provide that payment is a condition precedent to
the formation of a binding bilateral contract of sale.

In fact, if

the appraiser determines the stock to be valueless, there would be
no need for payment.

The issue of payment is irrelevant.

The sole

question that must be determined is whether the contract of sale
was in full force and effect at the time the option was exercised.
The passing of title is not predicated upon payment of the purchase

TD1

-9-

price.

12A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations

§5628 (rev. perm, ed. 1972).

See also, Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy

Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241, 245 (1967); Currey v.
Willard Steam Service, 321 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1958).
Plaintiff likewise contends that title to his shares does
not pass until actual delivery of his stock certificate.

It is

well established that actual delivery of the certificate is not
essential to the passing of title.

Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco

Polo, 17 Utah 2d 181, 407 P.2d 565 (1965)-

See also, 12A Fletcher

Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §5626 (rev. perm, ed.
197 2); 11 Fletcher Cyclopedia on the Law of Private Corporations
§5094 (rev. perm. ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
This Court in Davies v. Semloh Hotel, 86 Utah 318, 44 P.2d
689 (1935), held that title to stock purchased under a binding contract of sale vests at the time the contract is entered into.

In

Davies, the defendant offered plaintiff cash and certain shares of
stock in return for plaintiff's agreement to work for the
defendant.

The employment contract also obligated plaintiff to

purchase capital stock in the defendant corporation.

In addition,

the contract provided that if plaintiff was ever fired, the hotel
would repurchase the stock.

Upon his termination, plaintiff

demanded payment for his stock.

Defendant refused.

The jury found

in favor of plaintiff.
On appeal, defendant contended that it was not obligated
to purchase the stock from plaintiff.

This Court rejected the

defendant's argument, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
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by stating:
This transaction did not contemplate an option
on the part of the defendant to repurchase the
stock, nor did it constitute what might be
termed an offer to purchase the stock. It was
a binding contract upon both parties subject
only to a condition subsequent, viz., the
discharge of the plaintiff from the employment
contemplated in the contract. The condition
subsequent having been fulfilled in the
discharge of the plaintiff and the plaintiff
having made tender of the stock, there would
seem to be no good reason why he should not
recover. It was the clear intention of the
parties that the title of the stock should
pass to the defendant upon the happening of
the events as outlined upon which defendant
became bound to pay.
Davies, 44 P.2d at 690-91.

(Emphasis added.)

This Court in Taylor v. Paynes, 118 Utah 72, 218 P.2d 1069
(1950), clearly holds that title to stock transfers upon the execution of a binding contract of sale, even though delivery and
endorsement of the shares has not yet taken place.
out of a dispute between Marvin S.

Taylor arose

Taylor and J. Fred Daynes, both

shareholders in the Daynes Optical Company.

Soon after the company

was formed, Taylor expressed a desire to sell his stock.

On July

20, 1947, the corporate directors met to discuss the purchase of
Taylorfs stock.

On Monday, July 21, 1947, Taylor took his stock

certificate to defendant's office.

Defendant accepted the stock

certificate and kept the stock certificate for several months.
When plaintiff failed to receive any money for the stock, he took
back the stock certificate in February, 1948.

Plaintiff later

endorsed and returned the stock certificate to defendant.
Plaintiff then filed suit against defendant, alleging that

D7
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defendant had purchased the stock.

The trial court found that the

defendant had purchased the stock certificate on July 21, 1947, and
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff.
On appeal, the defendant contended that there could not
have been a sale on July 21, 1947, since existing Utah law
prohibited the consummation of a stock sale prior to the time the
stock certificate was endorsed.

This Court squarely rejected the

defendant's argument, and held that title had vested in the
defendant, thereby obligating him to pay for the stock:
This being an action to recover the contract
price of $6,000 and the trial court having
found that the contract was one of immediate
purchase, the time of indorsement is not
material to appellant's liability so long as
the indorsement is made upon tender of the
purchase price. If, on July 21, 1947, the
appellant obligated himself to pay for the
purchase price of this stock, then the mere
fact that transfer was not made would not
defeat respondent's right to recover.
*

*

*

The appellant acquired an interest in
the stock certificate on July 21, 1947, and
should not escape paying therefor.
Taylor, 218 P.2d at 1073-74 (emphasis added).
Cases from other jurisdictions, dealing with the issue of
whether a stockholder retains a right of inspection after entering
into a binding contract of sale, provide persuasive evidence that
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiff still has a
right of inspection.

Nash v. Gay Apparel Corp., 11 Misc.2d 768,

175 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (1958); Dierking v. Associated Books Service,
Inc., 31 Misc.2d 995, 222 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (1960); Rosenberg v.

un

1

O

Steinberg-Kass, Inc., 18 Misc.2d 880, 190 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1959).
POINT II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONTRACT AWAY
HIS STATUTORY RIGHT OF INSPECTION.
Upon R.O.A.'s election to purchase plaintiff's outstanding
shares, plaintiff is obligated to conduct an independent appraisal
to determine the value of the stock.

This appraisal right serves

the same purpose as the statutory right of inspection.

The

Agreement reflects the parties1 intent that the contractual right
of appraisal supersede and replace any statutory right of inspection.
It is well established that, in the absence of an express statutory
provision, parties may enter into contracts abrogating or limiting
statutory provisions which confer a right or benefit upon one or
both parties.

Francam Building Corp. v. Fail, 646 P.2d 345 (Colo.

1982), appeal after remand, 687 P.2d 991 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
Following R.O.A.'s purchase of plaintiff's stock, the
parties intended that the stock's value be determined in accordance
with the parties' Agreement.

It would be totally inconsistent with

the terms of the Agreement to find that the parties contemplated
that plaintiff would be allowed not only his rights of appraisal,
but also his statutory right of inspection.

The only reasonable

interpretation of the Agreement is that the parties intended the
contractual right of appraisal to be the sole means by which
plaintiff would be permitted to inspect the books of R.O.A.

As a

result, even if plaintiff retained his status as a shareholder, he
had no statutory right of inspection.

POINT III.
PLAINTIFF'S DEMANDS TO INSPECT WERE NOT
DONE AT A REASONABLE TIME NOR FOR A
PROPER PURPOSE.
While the Court of Appeals characterizes defendants'
actions as obtrusive and in violation of plaintiff's statutory
right of inspection, the record clearly indicates that the
defendants tried to assist the plaintiff in his attempt to review
the books and records of R.O.A.

Despite defendants' efforts, the

plaintiff has refused to conduct the inspections in a reasonable
manner.

Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) (1953), does not grant a blan-

ket right of inspection to a stockholder.

Utah law clearly

requires that the demand for inspection be made at reasonable times
and for a proper purpose.
Defendants raised several affirmative defenses challenging
the reasonableness and appropriateness of plaintiff's demand.
First, defendants assert that several critical facts suggest that
the plaintiff's demand to exercise his statutory right of inspection was motivated solely by an intent to harass the defendants.
It is undisputed that plaintiff for several years had unbridled
access to the books and records of R.O.A.
a stockholder in R.O.A.
corporation.

Plaintiff was not merely

He was, in fact, a director of the

It is also undisputed that plaintiff had previously

reviewed, both personally and by his accountant, the same books and
records of R.O.A. he now seeks to inspect.

The plaintiff's failure

to demand a formal statutory inspection of the corporate records
prior to R.O.A.'s election to purchase his stock suggests strongly

that the plaintiff's demands were meant solely to vex and harass
the defendants.

Under such circumstances, courts have limited or

denied a shareholder's statutory right of inspection.

See Skouras

v. Admiralty Enterprises, Inc., 386 A.2d 674 (Del. 1978); and Foss
v. Peoples Gas Light and Coal Co., 241 111. 238, 89 N.E. 351 (1909).
This Court in Clawson v. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 93 P.2d
729, 731 (Utah 1908), recognizes a corporation's right to refuse an
inspection when the demand is unreasonable or for an improper
purpose.

Clawson also holds that a shareholder must demand inspec-

tion at reasonable times which would not unnecessarily impede or
interfere with the ongoing operation of the corporation.

See also,

Holmes v. Bishop, 75 Utah 419, 285 P. 1011 (1930); Goddard v.
General Reduction and Chemical Co., 57 Utah 180, 193 P. 1103
(1920).

In addition, a demand to inspect a corporation's books and

records may be properly denied if the needed information is available in other, less inconvenient, ways.

See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11,

45 (1951).
The parties' Agreement provides that a valuation appraisal
will be conducted by independent parties.

There is, therefore, no

apparent reason for plaintiff to burden R.O.A. with multiple
inspections, unless the inspections are directly related to the
appraisal process.

Defendants maintain that the only reason

plaintiff is demanding to conduct a separate review of R.O.A.fs
records pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) is to harass and
vex defendants, and thereby obtain some advantage in arriving at a
favorable sale price for his stock.

_1 C _

At a minimum, the record is

inadequate to support the Court of Appeals1 ruling that plaintiff's
inspection request was for a proper purpose as a matter of law.
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff properly invoked his
statutory right of inspection, plaintiff's demands have been
unreasonable.

Defendants submit that the records and books of

R.O.A. contain various trade secrets and other information, which
if leaked or revealed to competitors, could severely damage the
economic viability of R.O.A.'s operations.

(R. at 288)

Due to the

sensitive nature of corporate records, courts have permitted corporations to require non-disclosure assurances from shareholders.
CM&M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 794 (Del. 1982).
Defendants repeatedly requested that plaintiff and
plaintiff's agents sign a confidentiality agreement prior to their
inspection of the books and records of R.O.A.

They refused.

As a

result of their refusal, plaintiff's demand should not be
considered reasonable.
Defendants' refusal to permit plaintiff to inspect the
corporate records of R.O.A. was further supported by evidence that
plaintiff on a prior occasion had taken unfair advantage of a
corporate opportunity while serving as a director of another
corporation.

(R. at 158, 215-16)

Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c)

provides that a corporation may refuse to open its books for
inspection where the shareholder "has improperly used any
information secured through any prior examination of the books and
records of account, or minutes, or record of shareholders of such
corporation or any other corporation . . . ."

(Emphasis added.)

The determination of whether a shareholder has acted
reasonably in making demand upon a corporation to inspect its
records is a matter more properly left to the trial court.

The New

Mexico Supreme Court in Schwartzman v. Schwartzman Packing Co., 99
N.M. 436, 659 P.2d 888 (1983), held that a trial court has
discretion to determine when and in what manner the right of
examination by shareholders should be exercised.

The Court of

Appeals erred in holding as a matter of law that plaintiff's
inspection requests were reasonable and proper.
POINT IV.
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST THAT PRECLUDE
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF.
Even if the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that
plaintiff had a statutory right to inspect the books and records of
R.O.A., numerous material issues of fact exist should have prevented
the Court of Appeals from ordering the trial court to grant plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.

Defendants respectfully

submit that the determination of whether plaintiff requested such
an inspection at a reasonable time and for a proper purpose, and
whether defendants' refusal to permit such an inspection was
wrongful are clearly questions of fact.

See, Curkendall v. United

Federation of Correction Officers, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 935, 483
N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (1985); and DePaula v. Memory Gardens, Inc., 90
A.D.2d 886, 456 N.Y.S.2d 522, 524 (1982).
The record demonstrates that defendants believed that
plaintiff's demand was unreasonable and improper.

Defendants

repeatedly attempted to assist plaintiff in his attempt to review
R7
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the books and records of R.O.A.

Issues of fact remain as to

whether plaintiff gave adequate notice to defendants before demanding inspection of the R.O.A, books and records.

Issues of fact

remain as to whether the plaintiff's demands were reasonable due to
their particular timing in relation to the accounting practices of
R.O.A. and the availability of trained help to assist in the
inspection.

Issues of fact remain as to whether the scope of the

requested inspection exceeded the bounds of reasonableness.

The

determination of these critical issues of material fact requires
far more evidence and facts than appears in the record on appeal.
Indeed, each of these material issues of fact should be resolved by
a trier of fact, rather than by an appellate court.
Even if plaintiff is found to have a statutory right of
inspection, there are substantial issues of material fact as to
whether plaintiff's demands were for a reasonable purpose.

Issues

of fact remain as to whether defendant's refusal was justified due
to their interpretation of the parties' Agreement, whether
defendants' actions were justified due to the plaintiff's refusal
to guarantee the confidentiality of the R.O.A. records, and whether
the defendants' refusal to permit the inspection of the R.O.A.
books was justified due to the plaintiff's alleged prior usurpation
of a corporate business opportunity.

The propriety of plaintiff's

demand should, therefore, be resolved by a trier of fact, rather
than by an appellate court.
In view of the numerous disputed issues of material fact,
this Court should vacate the Court of Appeals' ruling that

D7
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defendants1 refusal was wrongful or unlawful.

The determination of

these issues should be made by the trier of fact.
POINT V.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO MULTIPLE STATUTORY
PENALTIES FOR DEFENDANTS1 REFUSAL TO PERMIT
ACCESS TO R.O.A.'S BOOKS AND RECORDS.
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1953) provides a statutory
penalty for any officer, agent or corporation which refuses to
allow a shareholder to examine its corporate books and records.
The Court of Appeals broadly construed Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c)
to permit an award of multiple statutory penalties for what it
characterized as three separate refusals by defendants.

It is well

established that such statutory penalty provisions are penal in
nature, and are therefore subject to the rule of strict
interpretation.

Padovano v. Wotizky, 355 So.2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1978); and 18A Am.Jur.2d Corporations §421 (1985).

Since the

Utah statute is silent on the availability of multiple statutory
penalty awards, this Court should rule as a matter of law that such
multiple awards are forbidden.

Assuming arguendo that multiple

penalties are available under Utah law, the matter should be
remanded to the trial court for a determination of how many, if
any, refusals the defendant made.

See Meyer v. Ford Industries,

Inc., 272 Or. 531, 538 P.2d 353 (1975).

R7
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendants respectfully request
that this Court vacate the Court of Appeals' decision and affirm
the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants or, in the alternative, remand this action for resolution of
any disputed issues of fact.
DATED this

^
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_ , 1989.
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-2(15) (1953)
(15) "Shareholder" means one who is a
holder of record of shares in a corporation.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-47(b) and (c) (1953)
(b) Any person who is a shareholder of
record, upon written demand stating the purpose
thereof, shall have the right to examine, in
person, or by agent or attorney, at any reasonable
time or times, for any proper purpose, its books
and records of account, minutes and record of
shareholders and to make extracts therefrom. A
proper purpose means a propose reasonably related
to the person's interest as a shareholder.
(c) Any officer or agent who, or a corporation
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder,
or his agent or attorney, so to examine and make
extracts from its books and records of account,
minutes, and record of shareholders, for any
proper purpose, shall be liable to such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of the value of the
shares owned by such shareholder, in addition to
any other damages or remedy afforded him by law;
but no such penalty shall exceed $5,000. It shall
be a defense to any action for penalties under
this section that the person suing therefor has
within two years sold or offered for sale any
list of shareholders of such corporation or any
other corporation or has aided or abetted any
person in procuring any list of shareholders for
any such purpose, or has improperly used any
information secured through any prior examination
of the books and records of account, or minutes,
or record of shareholders of such corporation or
any other corporation, or was not acting in good
faith or for a proper purpose in making his demand.
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3. On the contrary, the "strict construction" rule
that is employed in connection with insurance policies accomplishes just the opposite result. Any
ambiguity concerning the scope of insurance is
construed in favor of coverage. See, e.g., Fuller v.
Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah
1985) ("An insured is entitled to the broadest protection he could have reasonably understood to be
provided by the policy.*); Williams v. First Colony
Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979)
(ambiguity in insurance contract must be construed
in favor of insured); Dienes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co.,
21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P.2d 468, 471 (1968) (no
ambiguous statement may be enforced against an
insured). See also Colard v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 11, 14 (Colo. App. 1985) (if an
insurance company intends to exclude from coverage
damage resulting from the insured's own negligence,
it must do so clearly and unambiguously); American
Excess Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 729
P.2d 1352, 1354 (Nev. 1986) (insurance contracts are
construed to accomplish the object of providing
indemnity to the insured); Weldon v. Commercial
Union Assurance Co., 103 N.M. 522, 710 P.2d 89,
91 (1985) ("When an ambiguity exists, the court
must construe the policy so as to sustain indemnity.").
4. Under different facts, the lack of explicit language clearly indicating an intent to provide coverage
for the insured's own negligence may leave open the
question of whether such coverage was intended.
However, such ambiguity would be resolved through
the ordinary rules of contract interpretation rather
than by invoking the strict construction rule. See
generally Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d
582, 585-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
5. We do not suggest that the presence of other
insurance is irrelevant in such cases. In an action for
breach of a contract to provide insurance, the
measure of general damages is typically the amount
the policy would have paid had it been obtained. See,
e.g., PPG Indust. v. Continental Heller Corp.,
124 Ariz. 216, 603 P.2d 108, 113-114 (1979). That
amount could readily be affected by the existence of
two or more policies (including policies of insurance
which should have been obtained as contractually
required) providing coverage for the same loss. See,
e.g., Utah Code Ann. §31 A-21-307(2) (1986).
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Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme. *
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Roland Webb filed this action against
R.O.A. General, Inc. ("R.O.A."), a Utah
corporation, and William Reagan, its majority
shareholder, and others, in part to enforce his
claimed right to examine R.O.A.'s corporate
books and records pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §16-10-47(0) (1987), a section of the
Utah Business Corporation Act (the "Act").
He also sought the imposition of penalties
under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1987)
for respondents' refusals to permit such an
examination. The trial court, on crossmotions for partial summary judgment on
these claims, ruled Webb had no inspection
rights because he had ceased being a shareholder of record within the meaning of the
statute. We reverse.
Webb and Reagan formed R.O.A. by
written agreement dated July 7, 1981. Reagan
received eighty percent of the stock and Webb
the remaining twenty percent. Reagan remains
the controlling shareholder and corporate
president. The incorporation agreement gives
R.O.A. an option to purchase Webb's shares,
but the option provisions do not fix a purchase price. Instead, after the option is exercised, the parties are to engage in an alternating
appraisal process to arrive at a price, begin-
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ning with an appraiser selected by the seller. allowed by. R.O.A. because it would disrupt
The final pricing step is that "any appraisal business and there was no staff person availagreed to by two of the three appraisers shall able to find the company's files. This refusal
be binding on the parties hereto absent was confirmed in a letter from Adams that
fraud." No time frame or deadline is specified afternoon stating that R.O.A. staff would be
for the appraisal process. When this process available one-half day each day for the week
yields a purchase price, the agreement provides commencing June 15,1987.
alternative payment terms: (1) in cash; (2) 120
Webb's counsel and accountants appeared
equal monthly payments with interest; or (3) at R.O.A. offices at 9:00 a.m. on June 15, but
such other terms as may be agreed to by the were again refused access to the books and
parties. The agreement contains no provision records by Reagan and Hall, another R.O.A.
or time frame for delivery of the stock.
attorney, who asserted for the first time that
Reagan served Webb with a notice of Webb had no inspection right because of
R.O.A.'s exercise of its option dated January R.O.A.'s January 1987 notice of its exercise
27, 1987. The notice did not identify any of the stock purchase option.
price, select any terms of payment, or propose
Webb then amended his complaint to add
any time frame for the stock conveyance. allegations about the two June refusals. In his
Reagan's notice invited Webb to meet with second cause of action, he requested recovery
him at Webb's earliest convenience "to discuss of a statutory penalty under section 16-10information which I have concerning the value 47(c) against R.O.A., and against Reagan and
of the R.O.A. General, Inc. stock" and other Adams separately for each of the three refuaspects of the transaction.
sals of inspection. He also sought injunctive
According to the facts set forth by Webb in relief to enforce his inspection rights under
affidavits filed in support of his motion for section 16-1047(b). His ensuing motion for
partial summary judgment, Webb pledged his partial summary judgment on this cause of
stock in March 1987, at R.O.A.'s request, to action was filed only against R.O.A. and
secure a bank loan to R.O.A. On April 20, Reagan, although he specifically reserved the
1987, Webb submitted to R.O.A. a written right to proceed subsequently against Adams
request to examine the corporate books and and Hall.
records pursuant to section 16-10-47 in
In their cross-motion for partial summary
order to protect his interests as a shareholder judgment, R.O.A. and Reagan argued Webb's
and determine R.O.A.'s actual financial statutory right to examine the corporate books
condition. R.O.A.'s vice president of admin- terminated as a matter of law when R.O.A.
istration and finance responded in a letter gave notice of exercise of its option to purcdated May 5, 1987, suggesting that Webb (1) hase his stock, even though he was still shown
postpone the inspection a few weeks because on the corporate books as a holder of twenty
of the departure of a key employee in the percent of the stock and had neither endorsed,
accounting department, (2) specify which delivered, or received payment for his shares.
records were to be examined, and (3) wait a They also filed the affidavits of Reagan and
few weeks until Reagan returned to town. R.O.A.'s vice president in opposition to
Webb, through one of his accountants, then Webb's motion, purporting to create material
sent an itemized list of the specific records and issues of fact about the reasonableness of their
documents he wanted to examine.
refusal of his inspection requests, even if he
On May 20, 1987, Webb's counsel sent a retained his inspection rights under the statute.
letter notifying R.O.A. of the appraiser sele- The affiants, however, did not deny the facts
cted and of Webb's intent to proceed with the asserted in Webb's supporting affidavits,
inspection of the corporate records on May including the fact that Webb had been refused
27, 1987, a normal business day, beginning at access to the books and records on May 27,
10:00 a.m. On May 26, R.O.A.'s counsel, June 4, and June 15. They merely claimed that
William Adams, delivered to the offices of Webb had been provided monthly financial
Webb's counsel a letter stating that the books statements and access to the corporate records
would be made available for inspection when prior to July 1986 and asserted that his requthe selected appraiser, not other accountants, ests were not reasonable, citing several excuses
wanted to examine them. Webb's counsel and for the refusals, such as lack of key personnel
accountants proceeded to R.O.A.'s corporate and disruption of the business. They also
offices on May 27, as planned, but were argued that Webb's requests were vexatious
refused access to the books and records by and went beyond the information he really
needed. In his affidavit, Reagan accused Webb
Adams, after consultation with Reagan.
On May 29, Webb commenced this lawsuit. of making the requests in bad faith to harass
On June 3, 1987, his counsel submitted to the corporation. No facts were asserted to
R.O.A. another written notice of Webb's support these conclusory claims or to dispute
intent to have his accountants inspect the the purpose asserted by Webb, i.e., to protect
corporate records, this time on June 5, 1987. his interests as minority shareholder and detWebb's counsel was informed by Adams on ermine the true financial condition of the
June 4 that the inspection would not be corporation. Affiant Reagan did dispute
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Webb's assertion that his stock was worth
more than $50,000, contending that, even if
there was a refusal of Webb's lawful inspection demand, the statutory penalty could not
be calculated until the value of Webb's shares
was determined according to the terms of their
agreement.
The trial court agreed with the respondents
and held that Webb's inspection right and his
status as a shareholder of record under section
16-10-47(b) terminated when R.O.A. exercised its purchase option. That ruling presents
a narrow legal issue of first impression in
Utah.
Section 16-10-47(b) provides:
Any person who is a shareholder! 1]
of record, upon written demand
stating the purpose thereof, shall
have the right to examine, in
person, or by agent or attorney, at
any reasonable time or times, for
any proper purpose, its books and
records of account, minutes and
record of shareholders and to make
extracts therefrom. A prope»
purpose means a purpose reasonably related to the person's interest
as a shareholder.
On appeal, we review the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, with no particular deference to the trial court. Creer v.
Valley Bank & Trust, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
(1988); Western Kane County Special Serv.
Dist. No. I v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d
1376, 1378 (Utah 1987). That same lack of
deference applies to the trial court's interpretation of an unambiguous, integrated contract, Zion's First Nat'I Bank v. National Am.
Title & Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah
1988), and to its interpretation of statutes,
Bonham v. Morgan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9
(1989); Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah
1988), both of which present questions of law.
The issue central to this appeal is the nature
of the contract the parties intended to create
at the time of the exercise of R.O.A.'s purchase option. See Taylor v. Daynes, 118 Utah
61, 218 P.2d 1069, 1072 (1950); Jones v.
Commercial In v. Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 P.
896, 900 (1924). That intent must be determined as a matter of law from the nature and
text of the entire written agreement itself, if
possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.,
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); accord 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. §5613 (1984). In other
words, did the parties intend title to Webb's
stock to be transferred to R.O.A. upon exercise of the option, leaving executory only their
respective purchase and sale obligations under
the contract?2 Or did they intend that exercise
of the option would create a wholly executory
contract to sell the shares, with title to remain
in Webb until transferred to R.O.A. at some
subsequent time?
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Here, the agreement of the parties did not
specify the time for transfer of legal title to
Webb's shares or their actual delivery. But it
did leave open for determination, after exercise of R.O.A.'s purchase option, both the
purchase price and the final terms of payment,
without specifying the time frame for the
completion of those determinations. Thus, the
parties recognized there must be further agreement on each of these terms after R.O.A.*s
notice. These terms and the parties' use of the
potentially lengthy appraisal process to set the
price of Webb's stock compel the conclusion
that they did not intend that Webb would
immediately divest himself of legal ownership
of the shares at the moment the option was
exercised, but that he would retain legal title
until some later time when these essential
terms of the sale were completed. It is thus
clear from the agreement itself that the parties
intended legal ownership to transfer to R.O.A.
at some point after notice was given, concurrent with a subsequent event, such as full
payment or commencement of installment
payments.3
This interpretation of the parties' agreement
is buttressed by the uncontroverted facts that
Webb pledged his stock at R.O.A.'s request
even after R.O.A.'s notice of exercise of its
option and, at least until June 15, R.O.A. and
Reagan treated Webb as the legal owner of the
shares. It is also consistent with the conclusions of other courts in cases involving similar
agreements and similar inspection rights.
For example, in Estate of Bishop v. Antilles
Enters., Inc., 252 F.2d 498 (3rd Cir. 1958), the
shareholders of the respondent corporation
entered into a cross-purchase agreement
providing that, upon the death of shareholder
Bishop, the surviving shareholders had the
option to purchase his shares from his estate
at book value. Following Bishop's death,
Vose, one of the surviving shareholders, asserted his right to purchase Bishop's stock
from his estate. Vose claimed the stock was
worthless and tendered $1.00 in payment. The
district court held that the estate was entitled,
as a holder of legal title, to exercise its
common law right to examine the corporation's books and records. On appeal, the
respondent corporation contended that "by
virtue of the agreement between the stockholders, title to and ownership of Bishop's stock
had passed to Vose immediately upon the
election of the latter to purchase it." Id. at
499.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the corporation's argument and held that,
even assuming Vose's election of the option to
purchase the stock vested his right to transfer
of the stock upon payment of the purchase
price, it did not divest the estate administrator
of legal title to the shares or of the rights of a
stockholder. Id. Moreover, the court concluded, assuming the agreement to sell the stock
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was valid and binding,
the [administrator's] right ... to
have access to the books and
records of the corporation certainly
will continue at least until after the
proper amount of the purchase
price has been authoritatively determined and has been paid. Until
then it is obvious that the petitioner
has a very real interest in securing
accurate information as to the state
of the respondent corporation's
accounts....
Id.
Similarly, in Knaebel v. Heiner, 673 P.2d
885 (Alaska 1983), a shareholder, Knaebel,
had executed a valid contract that called for
the exchange of his shares (for stock in
another corporation) prior to the date of his
demand for inspection. Heiner, custodian of
the corporation's records, refused Knaebel's
written demand for inspection of the books
and records under a statute extending that
right to a "shareholder of record for at least
six months" or a "holder of record of at least
Vive percent of all the outstanding shares of a
corporation." Id. at 885 & n.l. Heiner argued
that, if there was a valid contract calling for
the exchange of Knaebel's stock on a certain
date prior to his demand for inspection, he
could have no right of inspection after that
date. Id. at 886.
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the contract
was executory until the exchange of the shares
actually took place. Thus, the agreement by
itself did not cancel Knaebel's status as a
shareholder of record for purposes of the
inspection statute, "any more than a land sale
contract which specifies a date for closing
cancels a recorded deed on the specified date."
Id. at 887. See also Shelters, Inc. v. Mankin,
130 Ga. App. 859, 204 S.E.2d 810 (1974)
(executory contract to sell stock to third party
did not deprive shareholder of statutory right
of inspection); Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber
Co., 199 Okla. 672, 189 P.2d 929 (1948)
(despite corporation's exercise of option to
purchase stock, shareholder retained title as
legal owner together with statutory right of
inspection).
We conclude that the contract formed when
the notice of exercise of option was given to
Webb constituted a contract to sell the shares,
with legal title remaining in Webb after that
point in time. Accordingly, R.O.A.'s notice of
exercise of its option pursuant to the parties'
agreement did not terminate Webb's status as
a shareholder of record for purposes of
section 16-10-47(b). The trial court erred in
ruling otherwise.
We next address briefly R.O.A.'s claim that
Webb waived or contracted away his statutory
right of inspection because the parties' agre-
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ement provided for an appraisal procedure to
be followed after the option notice was served.
Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a
known right. Hunter v. Hu uerf 669 P.2d 430,
431 (Utah 1983). "It must be distinctly made,
although it may be express or implied." Id.
(quoting American Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3
(1968)). Assuming the statutory right could be
contracted away consistent with public policy,
R.O.A. has not identified any contract provision which either expressly or impliedly
waives or modifies Webb's statutory inspection right. Indeed, Section 16 of their agreement, captioned "Rights of Ownership,"
states, "The Stockholders shall retain all their
rights as stockholders of the Corporation,
except those specifically modified by this
Agreement." We conclude there was no waiver
or contractual surrender of Webb's rights as a
shareholder under section 16-10-47.
We turn now to the issue of statutory penalties against R.O.A. and Reagan. Utah Code
Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1987) provides:
Any officer or agent who, or a
corporation which, shall refuse to
allow any such shareholder, or his
agent or attorney, so to examine
and make extracts from its books
and records of account, minutes,
and record of shareholders, for any
proper purpose, shall be liable to
such shareholder in a penalty of
10% of the value of the shares
owned by such shareholder, in
addition to any other damages or
remedy afforded him by law; but
no such penalty shall exceed $5,000.
It shall be a defense to any action
for penalties under this section that
the person suing therefor has within
two years sold or offered for sale
any list of shareholders of such
corporation or any other corporation or has aided or abetted any
person in procuring any list of
shareholders for any such purpose,
or has improperly used any information secured through any prior
examination of the books and
records of account, or minutes, or
record of shareholders of such
corporation or any other corporation, or was not acting in good
faith or for a proper purpose in
making his demand.
As a shareholder of record, Webb had a right
to examine the corporate books pursuant to
section l6-10-47(b) at a reasonable time
upon written demand.4 The statute limits the
shareholder's inspection right only insofar as
the requested examination must be for a
"proper purpose," defined in that subsection
as one "reasonably related to the person's
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interest as a shareholder."
There is no question that Webb made the
necessary written demands for inspection of
R.O.A.'s books and records at reasonable
times, i.e., during normal business hours. See
Clawson v. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 272, 93 P.
729, 731 (1908). Based on the undisputed facts
inthe record, we find that, as a matter of law,
Webb's inspection requests were for a proper
purpose within the meaning of the act,
namely, to determine the corporation's true
financial condition and thereby protect his
interests as a minority shareholder in the
process of selling his shares.
In their response to Webb's motion for
partial summary judgment, R.O.A. and
Reagan did not dispute the stated facts concerning the direct refusals of Webb's demands
for inspection on three occasions. Instead,
their supporting affidavits merely offered
excuses which, even if true, would not establish any of the defenses to an action for penalties enumerated in section 16-10-47(c),
and made conclusory allegations of bad faith
without asserting any supportive facts.5 See
Brigham Truck & Implement Co. v. Fridal,
746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 1987); Williams v.
Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985).
R.O.A.'s and Reagan's repeated stall
tactics, first leading Webb to believe inspection would be granted, then refusing access to
the books at the agreed-upon time for specious, fluid reasons, represent exactly the type
of conduct by a corporation or its officers or
agents that the statute is designed to curtail
through the imposition of penalties. Without
sanctions to discourage the refusal of proper
inspection requests, the corporation or its
officers "could, by refusing access, delay inspection until the right was actually litigated."
2 Model Business Corporation Act §52
commentary at 129(2ded. 1971).
Section 16-10-47(c) clearly authorizes the
imposition of a penalty for each refusal to
•allow inspection. Unlike the shareholders in
Meyer v. Ford Industries, Inc., 272 Or. 531,
538 P.2d 353 (1975), who sought the imposition of eight statutory penalties because that
was the number of items they had asked to
inspect, Webb made three separate and independent requests, which were separately
refused. We agree with Webb that, if the
statute is to have any deterrent effect, violating parties should not be permitted to purchase multiple and serial exemptions from the
law's mandate for a one-time penalty fee,
regardless of how often they refuse distinct,
lawful shareholder demands for inspection of
the corporate records.*
Based on the undisputed facts in the record,
Reagan, as an individual, and R.O.A., as an
entity, each participated in the May 27 and
June 15 refusals; R.O.A., as an entity, was a
participant in the June 4 refusal, while
Reagan, as an individual, was not. See gene-

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. The Act defines a shareholder as "one who is a
holder of record of shares in a corporation." Utah
Code Ann. §16-10-2(15) (1987) (redesignated as
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-2(11) (1988)).
2. The issue presented in Taylor v. Daynes, 118
Utah 61, 218 P.2d 1069 (1950), was whether oral
negotiations about the sale of stock, coupled with
the parties' conduct and a written memorandum,
constituted an executory contract to purchase the
stock or a present purchase and sale accompanied
by an immediate transfer of interest when the stock
certificates were handed over to the purchaser. The
trial court's finding that the parties intended a
contract of immediate sale and purchase was upheld
by the Utah Supreme Court as supported by the
evidence at trial. Taylor, 218 P.2d at 1072. In an
earlier case involving the interpretation of a written
agreement by an employer to repurchase stock sold
to an employee if the employee was discharged, the
court determined that the parties had intended title
to the stocks to transfer to the employer immediately upon the occurrence of the condition subsequent, i.e., the employee's discharge. Davies v.
Semloh Hotel, 86 Utah 318,44 P.2d 689 (1935).
3. In the context of a preliminary agreement for the
sale of an apartment building, the Utah Supreme
Court has stated:
There is implied in an agreement for the
sale of real estate, unless a contrary
intention is expressed, that the vendor
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rally 5A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. §2256 (1987).
Webb is, therefore, entitled to partial
summary judgment against each responsible
respondent in the amount of the mandatory
statutory penalty for each of the three separate
refusals to allow him to exercise his inspection
rights as a shareholder.
Because the statute sets the amount of each
penalty at ten percent of the value of the
shareholder's shares plus other damages, not
to exceed $5,000, and the parties' agreement
dictates that the value of Webb's shares is to
be determined through the appraisal process,
the amount of each penalty must be fixed by
the trial court on remand after the valuation is
complete and Webb has been afforded an
opportunity to present evidence concerning
any other damages to which he is entitled..
The partial summary judgment entered in
favor of respondents is reversed. The case is
remanded for entry of partial summary judgment against Reagan and R.O.A., in accordance with this opinion, and for further proceedings to determine the amount of the statutory penalty to be imposed on them for each
of the three separate wrongful refusals to
permit inspection of the corporate books and
records. In addition, the district court is directed to grant forthwith Webb's request for
injunctive relief enforcing his statutory inspection right.
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shall retain title until the balance of the
purchase price is paid Where there is an
agreement on the part of one to convey
and on the part of another to pay a
definite sum, payment and conveyance
are concurrent acts, unless a contrary
intention appears
Johnson v Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P 2d 893, 895
(1946)
4 Any corporate agent or officer with custody or
control of corporate books who refuses a bona fide
shareholder's lawful demand for their inspection or
copying is also guilty of a class B misdemeanor
Utah Code Ann §76-10-708(1978)
5 In a second affidavit filed with the trial court,
Reagan sought to justify the refusals on the basis
that the records Webb sought to examine were
confidential This fact alone, however, is insufficient
to deny the statutory inspection right See Fc&rs v
Cattlemen's Inv Co, 483 P 2d 724, 730 (Okla
1971)
6 By the same token, penalties should not be artificially compounded by identical, repetitious requests that prompt multiple, predictable refusals Form
is not to be elevated over substance in determining
the number of independent requests made by a
shareholder of record, each of which qualifies for a
separate penalty if refused There might be cases in
which multiple "requests'* would be more properly
regarded as a single request repeatedly renewed
However, this is not such a case It is clear that
three separate requests were made by Webb and
refused, as evidenced by the passage of time
between requests and the inconsistent variety of
responses Webb's first request to examine the
books and records on May 27 was denied for the
express reason that only Webb's appraiser, not his
accountants, was a proper agent His June 3 inspection request, on the other hand, was denied
because it would be disruptive and no staff was
available to find the necessary files, which had been
identified by Webb in early May Instead, Webb
was informed, the inspection would proceed on June
15, with R O A staff available at that time When
Webb's agents appeared on June 15, as instructed,
access to the corporate records was again refused,
this time because of Webb's alleged lack of
"shareholder of record" status
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IN T H E
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Greg Phillip CASIAS, aka Greg Phil Casias,
aka John Paul Sanchez,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 870585-CA
FILED: April 14, 1989
Third District, Summit County
Honorable Homer F Wilkinson
ATTORNEYS.
Elliott Levine, West Valley City, for Appellant
R Paul Van-Dam and Elizabeth Holbrook,
Salt Lake City, for Respondent
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant Greg Phillip Casias was convicted by a jury of burglary in violation of Utah
Code Ann §76-6-202(1) (1978), and two
counts of second degree theft in violation of
Utah Code Ann §76-6-404 (1978) Casias
appeals from his convictions claiming the trial
court erred in allowing 1) photocopies of his
palm prints into evidence, and 2) the State to
charge him for two counts of theft under §766-404, theft of a firearm, a second degree
felony under §76-6-412(lXaXu), and theft
of property valued in excess of $1,000, a
second degree felony under §76-6412(l)(a)(i), which arose from the same criminal episode Although we affirm Casias* s
convictions for burglary and one count of*
second degree theft, we find submitting two
counts of theft to the jury and the resulting
convictions thereon was error We, therefore,
remand the matter to the tnal court to vacate
one of the theft convictions.
FACTS
On May 14, 1987, a private residence in
Summit Park, Utah, was burglarized Items
reported missing included personal property
worth over $1,000 and a .25-caliber automatic pistol. Dunng the investigation, police
officers found a beer can m the bedroom of
the homeowner's daughter. The beer can was
sent to the state crime lab to recover latent
fingerprints. The fingerprint expert at the lab
recovered a left palm print and several finge"rpnnts from the can.
On May 28, 1987, the Salt Lake County
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January 27, 1987
CERTIFIED MAIL and
HAND DELIVERED

Mr. Roland Webb and
Mrs. Bessie P. Webb
1837 Baywood Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Dear Roland and Bessie:
This letter is to notify you that R.O.A. General, Inc. is hereby
exercising its option under paragraph 11 of that Agreement by and
between William K. Reagan, Roland Webb, Bessie P. Webb and R.O.A.
General, Inc. to purchase all of the R.O.A. General, Inc. stock
owned by the two of you.
At your earliest convenience, we should meet to discuss
information which I have concerning the value of the R.O.A.
General, Inc. stock. Also, we need to discuss the other aspects
of the transaction.
Very truly yours,
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC.

President
WKR/so
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1
AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made this _/

day of July, 1981, by and

among WILLIAM K. REAGAN, hereinafter sometimes referred to as
"Reagan" and ROLAND WEBB and BESSIE P. WEBB, hereinafter sometimes
collectively referred to as "Webb", all of the above hereinafter
sometimes referred to collectively as "the Stockholders" and each
singly as "Stockholder", and R.O.A. General, Inc., d/b/a Reagan
Outdoor Advertising, a Utah corporation, hereinafter referred to as
"the Corporation",
Recitals:
A,

The Stockholders, as incorporators, will organize a

corporation under the laws of the State of Utah, the Corporation,
for the purpose of engaging in operating an outdoor advertising
business, including the borrowing of money for such purpose, and to
engage in any other lawful business activity.
B.

The Stockholders will own all of the outstanding common

stock of the Corporation, hereinafter, including any such stock
issued hereafter, referred to as the "Stock,"
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises
herein contained and for other good and valuable consideration, the
parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Sale of Stock.

Reagan hereby agrees to sell to Webb

shares of stock of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc.

The amount of

stock shall be determined based upon the relative net worth of
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and Galaxy Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. on the date the Corporation purchases the stock of Galaxy
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. which is not owned by Webb, hereinafter
referred to as "Closing Date".

It has been agreed that the value of

Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. is $3,163,202 plus the amount of
cash, prepaid expenses, and the value of notes and accounts
receivables as of the Closing Date minus all liabilities at the
Closing Date, and the value of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. is
$5,100,000 plus the amount of cash, prepaid expenses, and the value
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of notes and accounts receivables as of the Closing Date minus all
liabilities, excluding deferred income taxes, at the Closing Date.
Current assets and liabilities of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc.
and Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. shall be determined using
consistent accounting principles.

The value of the stock to be

purchased by Webb shall be the difference between (i) the value of
Webb's stock in Galaxy Advertising, Inc. minus $255,727 divided by
20 percent; and (ii) the total value of Reagan Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. and Webb's stock in Galaxy Advertising, Inc.

The purchase

price shall be paid by a demand promissory note with interest at the
rate provided in paragraph 12.2(c) (ii).

Provided, however, Reagan

shall not be required to sell stock that would result in his owning
less than 66-2/3 percent of the stock of the Corporation.
2.

Subscription for Stock.
2.1

Stock Issued to Reagan.

In exchange for all of

the shares of stock of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. owned by
Reagan, after making the sale as provided in paragraph 1 above,
the Corporation shall issue to Reagan such shares that his
percentage ownership of the outstanding stock of the Corporation
shall equal the percentage determined by div.iding (i) the value
of the Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. stock, as defined in
paragraph 1, being contributed; by (ii) the total value of
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and the value of Webb's stock
of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., as defined in paragraph 1.
2.2

Stock Issued to Webb.

In exchange for all of the

shares of stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and Reagan
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. owned by Webb, after making the
purchase as provided in paragraph 1 above, the Corporation shall
issue to Webb such shares that his percentage ownership of the
outstanding stock of the Corporation shall equal the percentage
determined by dividing

(i) the value of the Reagan Outdoor

Advertising, Inc. stock and the Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc.
stock, as defined in paragraph 1, being contributed; by (ii) the
total value of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and the value of
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Webb's stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., as defined in
paragraph 1.
3.

Pledge of Stock.

No Stockholder shall, at any time,

transfer any-of his or her stock to any person other than the
Corporation, or a corporation which is a member of an affiliated
group, as amended, which includes the Corporation, hereinafter
referred to as a "Subsidiary", as security for any loan or other
obligation unless such Stockholder shall first obtain the written
consent of the holders of at least a majority of the Stock then
outstanding, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.

In

the event stock is pledged to the Corporation or a Subsidiary, such
pledgee shall be subject to paragraph 5 of this Agreement in the
event of any sale of such Stock by-such pledgee.
4.

Gifts of Stock.

No Stockholder shall transfer any of

his or her Stock other than for a valuable consideration (in which
event such transfer shall be subject to the provisions of either
paragraph 3 or 5 hereof) to any person other than (i) the
Corporation, or (ii) a Stockholder's spouse, one or more of his or
her lineal descendants, or a trust ot which the foregoing or any of
them are the primary beneficiaries and such person(s) has agreed in
a writing filed with the Secretary of the Corporation prior to such
transfer to be bound by all the terms of this Agreement in all
respects as though such person were originally a party hereto,
unless such Stockholder shall first obtain the written consent to
such transfer of the holders of a majority of the Stock then
outstanding, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
5.

Rights of First Refusal Upon Any Sale of Stock.
5.1

Notice of Intended Transfer.

Any Stockholder who

intends to transfer any of his or her Stock for a valuable
consideration to any person other than the Corporation (as
hereinafter defined) shall give seventy (70) days' prior written
notice of such intended transfer, hereinafter referred to as
"the Notice", to the Corporation and to each Stockholder*
NrtH,--
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to stating the fact of the intention so to
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transfer such Stock, shall state
Stock to be transferred,

(i) the number of shares of

(ii) the name, business and residence

address of the proposed transferee, and (iii) the amount or
market value of the consideration, hereinafter referred to as
the "Price", and all other terms of the intended transfer.
5.2

Primary Options to Purchase.

At any time within

thirty (30) days after receipt of the Notice by the Corporation,
the Corporation shall have the option to purchase all of the
Stock described in the Notice for the Price and upon terms not
less favorable to the Corporation than those granted the
proposed transferee.

Provided, however, if the proposed

transfer would not result in the recognition of gain for income
tax purposes, the price shall be increased to include the amount
of tax liability the Stockholder would recognize upon the
exercise of the Option.

Such option shall be exercisable by the

Corporation giving the transferring Stockholder, prior to the
expiration of said thirty (30) day period, a written notice of
its exercise of its option with respect to all of the Stock
described in the Notice.

If the Corporation does not exercise

the option, it shall, not later than five (5) days after the
expiration of said thirty (30) day period, advise each
Stockholder

(other than the transferring Stockholder) of the

date on which the Corporation received the Notice and of that
such option was not so exercised by the Corporation; provided,
however, that any failure or delay of the Corporation in giving
such advice to such Stockholders shall not in any way affect the
options of such Stockholders with respect to such Stock.
Any time within sixty (60) days after receipt of the
Notice by the Corporation, each Stockholder then holding Stock
(other than the transferring Stockholder) shall have the option
to purchase, for the Price and upon terms not less favorable to
such Stockholder than those granted the proposed transferee, all
or any portion of that proportion of the Stock described in the
Notice with respect to which the Corporation has not exercised
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its option which equals the proportion which the number of
shares of Stock owned by such Stockholder at the time of receipt
of the Notice by the Corporation is of the total number of
shares of Stock then owned by all such Stockholders,

Each such

option shall be exercisable by the exercising Stockholder giving
the transferring Stockholder and the Corporation, prior to the
expiration of said sixty (60) day period, a written notice of
their exercise of such option.
The options granted under this paragraph 5,2 are
sometimes hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Primary
Options" and singly as the "Primary Option".
5.3

Secondary Options to Purchaser.

If, upon the

expiration of sixty (60) days'after receipt of the Notice by the
Corporation, the Primary Options have not been exercised as
hereinabove provided with respect to all of the Stock described
in the Notice, each Stockholder who has theretofore exercised
his or her Primary Option as to all Stock which was subject
thereto shall have the further, option to purchase, for the Price
and upon terms not less favorable to such Stockholder than those
granted the proposed transferee, any shares of the Stock
described in the Notice with respect to which the Primary
Options were not exercised, hereinafter referred to as the
"Secondary Option Shares".

Such further options are hereinafter

sometimes referred to collectively as the "Secondary Options"
and singly as the "Secondary Option".
If, under the foregoing provisions of this paragraph
5.3, only one Stockholder shall have a Secondary Option, then
such Secondary Option shall be exercisable with respect to all
or any portion of the number of Secondary Option Shares which
bears the same proportion to the total number of such Secondary
Option Shares as the number of shares of such Stock owned at the
time of receipt by the Corporation of the Notice by each
Stockholder having a Secondary Option bears to .the total number
of shares of such Stock then owned by all Stockholders having a
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Secondary Option; provided, however, that all such Stockholders
having a Secondary Option may by agreement among themselves
determine the proportions in which some or all of them may
exercise^their respective Secondary Options.
Each Secondary Option shall be exercisable by the
exercising Stockholder giving the transferring Stockholder and
the Corporation a written notice of such exercise at any time
within seventy (70) days after receipt of the Notice by the
Corporation.
5.4
Options.

Condition of Exercise of Primary and Secondary

A condition precedent to the exercise of the Primary

and Secondary Options shall be that all Stock being offered for
transfer must be purchased pursuant to the exercise of the
Primary and Secondary Options.
5.5

Transfer After Termination of Options.

Any Stock

with respect to which none of the options hereinabove provided
for has been exercised may be transferred by the transferring
Stockholder to the proposed transferee free of any rights or
duties created by this Agreement*provided

that such transfer is

completed upon the same terms specified in the Notice within
ninety (90) days after receipt of the Notice by the Corporation.
If for any reason said transfer J.S not so completed within said
ninety (90) day period, then the transferring Stockholder may
not thereafter transfer any such Stock without giving a new
Notice as provided in paragraph 5.1 hereof, in which event such
Stock shall again become subject to all of the options
hereinabove provided for.

Provided, however, if Reagan proposes

to transfer Stock representing 50 percent or more of the Stock
of the Corporation and options hereinabove provided have not
been exercised, prior to the transfer of such Stock, Reagan
shall provide that Webb's Stock can be transferred, at Webb's
option, on the same terms and conditions.
5.6
seventy

If the transferring Stockholder ,dies within the

(70) days period referred to in paragraph 5.1 of this
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Agreement, the provisions of paragraphs 6,1 through 7.2 of this
Agreement, inclusive, shall become applicable to all Stock owned
by such transferring Stockholder other than Stock, if any,
subject to an option under this paragraph 5 which has been
exercised pursuant to the terms of this Agreement prior to the
death of such Stockholder.
6.

Options and Transfers After Death of Reagan.
6.1

Upon the death of Reagan, at the election of

Reagan's personal representative, the Corporation shall be
required to purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Reagan at
the time of his death, as hereinafter provided, if all of the
following conditions precedent have been or are concurrently
satisfied:
(a)

This Agreement continues in effect and has

not been terminated as provided in paragraph 15.
(b)

Within a reasonable time after the death of

Reagan but within nine (9) months an authorized
representative

(being one or more persons having

responsibility to file a return to pay Federal estate tax)
makes an application in writing either to the Board of
Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the
officers of the Corporation for benefits under this
paragraph and tenders to the Corporation the Stock to be
redeemed,
6.2

All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 6

shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12.
7.

Options and Tranfers after Death of Webb.
7.1

Upon the death of Webb, at the election of Webb's

personal representative, the Corporation shall be required to
purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Webb at such time, as
hereinafter provided, if all of the following conditions
precedent have been or are concurrently satisfied:
(a)

This Agreement continues in effect and has

not been terminated as provided in paragraph 15.

.«-:>
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(b)

Within a reasonable time after the death of

Webb, but within nine (9) months an authorized
representative of Webb (being one or more persons having
responsibility to file a return to pay Federal estate tax)
makes an application in writing either to the Board of
Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the
officers of the Corporation for benefits under this
paragraph and tenders to the Corporation the Stock to be
redeemed.
7.2

All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 7

shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12.
8.

Options and Transfers After August 1, 1981.
8.1

At any time after August 1, 1981 the Corporation

shall have the option to purchase such amount of stock owned by
Webb that would reduce his ownership of the outstanding stock of
the Corporation to 20 percent, or such additional stock as is
necessary to cause the redemption to qualify as a sale or
exchange under Section 302(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, but
not less than such amount.

Such'option shall be exercisable by

giving Webb written notice of such exercise.

Provided, however,

the Corporation may only exercise such option if such redemption
qualifies as a sale or exchange under Section 302(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
8.2

All redemptions of stock under this paragraph 8

shall be upon terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12.
9.

Options and Transfers After August 1, 1986 and

Thereafter.
9.1

On August 1, 1986, and on August 1 in each

succeeding year at the election of Webb, the Corporation shall
be required to purchase as much as 20 percent of the Stock,
owned by Webb on August 1, 1986, or such additional Stock as may
be necessary to qualify such redemption as a sale or exchange
under Section 302(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, as
hereinafter provided, if all of the following conditions
precedent have been or are concurrently satisfied:
-8-
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(a)

This Agreement continues

not been terminated
(b)

as provided

Within

makes an application

in effect and has

in paragraph 15.

five months after

such date, Webb

in writing either

to the Board

of

Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the
officers of the Corporation

for benefits under

paragraph and tenders to the Corporation

this

the Stock

to be

redeemed.
9.2

All redemptions of Stock under

shall be upon terms and conditions provided
10.

this paragraph 9

in paragraph

12.

Options Upon Death of W e b b .
10.1

Upon the death of Webb the Corporation

shall

have the option to purchase all -but not less than all the Stock
owned by Webb at such time of his death.

Such option shall be

exercisable by giving his personal representative written
of such exercise at any time within six
date of his death.

(6) months after

the expiration of said six

Stockholder

the

If the Corporation does not so exercise

option, the Corporation shall, not later
after

notice

than five

its

(5) days

(6) month period, advise

each

that such option was not so exercised by the

Corporation; provided, however, that any failure or delay of

the

Corporation

not

in giving

such advice to such Stockholders shall

in any way affect the options of such Stockholders with

respect

to such Stock.
At any time within sixty
Primary Option, or seventy

(60) d a y s , with respect to a

(70) days, with respect

to a

Secondary Option, after receipt of the Notice by the
Corporation, each Stockholder

shall have a Primary Option

if applicable, a Secondary Option to purchase all or any
of the Stock described

and,
portion

in the Notice with respect to which

Corporation has not exercised

its option, which Primary

and Secondary Options shall be exercisable

in the same

Options
manner

and proportions as, and subject to the same ter^ms and
conditions, provided

for

in paragraphs 5.2 and

-9-
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5.3 of

the

this

Agreement except that (i) all notices of the exercise of any
such option shall be given to his personal representative, (ii)
the time periods for exercising such options shall be measured
by reference to the time of receipt by the Corporation of the
Notice hereinabove referred to, (iii) the "Price* shall in each
instance, be the market value of the Stock with respect to which
the partiuclar option has been exercised.
10,2

All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 10

shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12.
11.

Options Upon August 1, 1986 and Thereafter.
11.1

At August 1, 1986 and on such date in each

succeeding year the Corporation shall have the option to
purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Webb on such date,
provided the Corporation must purchase sufficient Stock to have
the redemption qualify as an exchange under section 302(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.

Such option

shall be exercisable by giving Webb written notice of such
exercise at any time within six (6) months after such date.

If

the Corporation does not so exercise its option, the Corporation
shall, not later than five (5) days after the expiration of said
six (6) month period, advise each Stockholder of the date on
which the Corporation that such option was not so exercised by
the Corporation; provided, however, that any failure or delay of
the Corporation in giving such advice to such Stockholders shall
not in any way affect the options of such Stockholders with
respect to such Stock.
At any time within sixty (60) days, with respect to a
Primary Option, or seventy (70) days, with respect to a
Secondary Option, after receipt of the Notice by the
Corporation, each Stockholder shall have a Primary Option and,
if applicable, a Secondary Option to purchase all or any portion
of the Stock described in the Notice with respect to which the
Corporation has not exercised its option, which Primary Options
and Secondary Options shall be exercisable in the same manner
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and proportions as, and sub3ect to the same terms and
conditions, provided for in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 of this
Agreement except that (i) all notices of the exercise of any
such option shall be given to his personal representative, (ii)
the time periods for exercising such options shall be measured
by reference to the time of receipt by the Corporation of the
Notice hereinabove referred to, (iii) the "Price" shall in each
instance, be the market value of the Stock with respect to which
the partiuclar option has been exercised.
11.2

All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 11

shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12.
12.

Terms and Conditions of Purchase.
12.1

Purchase Price.

The purchase price of each

share of stock shall be the fair market value of the stock on
the date of purchase determined as follows:
The Stockholder who offers to sell his stock, or
the personal representatives of a decedent Stockholder,
shall appoint an appraiser to appraise the value of the
Stock.

If the other parties hereto do not agree to the

appraisal of such appraiser, such other parties shall
appoint a second appraiser to appraise the Stock,

The

average of the two appraisals so obtained shall be used in
determining the fair market value of the Stock, if the
higher of the two appraisals is no more than 105 percent of
the lower of the two appraisals; otherwise, the two
appraisers shall appoint a third appraiser, and any
appraisal agreed to by two of the three appraisers shall be
binding on the parties hereto absent fraud.

All appraisals

shall be based on the normal operations of the
Corporation.
appraisals.

The Corporation shall pay the costs of the
If the Stock is purchased under this Agreement

pursuant to options under paragraphs 10 or 11, and within
one year of such purchase Reagan sells his stock, the
purchase price and terms for the stock being purchased
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shall be adjusted

so as to be equal

at which Reagan sold his
12.2

Price.

In the event the stock being

being purchased

(b)
pursuant

purchased

upon the death of a Stockholder

paragraph 6, the purchase price
upon such other

shall be paid

terms as may be agreed
In the event

the stock

under

to by the p a r t i e s .
is being

purchased

to the exercise of the option under paragraph

note which shall bear

8,

promissory

interest at the rate provided

in

(c)(ii) below.
(c)

pursuant

is

in cash or

the purchase price shall be paid with a demand

paragraph

terms

stock.

Payment of Purchase
(a)

to the price and

In the event

the stock

is being

purchased

to the exercise of options under paragraphs

9 or

11, the purchase price shall be paid
(i)
(ii)
with accrued
one month
interest

In cash;
In 120 equal monthly payments

interest with the first such payment

from the date the option
rate shall be determined

payments due for one year
adjustment
over

together

is exercised.
annually

following

and shall be equal

The

for

the date of

to two percentage

points

the average rate for United States Treasury

with a 10-year maturity date
before and 15 days after

for the period

without penalty.
due under

this paragraph and

a transaction

that

was

anniversary

All amounts due may be

Provided, however,

Bonds

15 days

the date the option

exercised, or for subsequent years, the
date of such exercise.

due

prepaid

if payments

are

Reagan sells his stock

is not a reorganization

under

Section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended,

the payments due under

this paragraph

thereafter, at the option of Webb, be on the
payment due and terms of such sale; or
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same

in

(iii)

Upon such other terms as may be agreed

to by the parties.
(d)

In the event the stock is being purchased

pursuant,to the exercise of options under paragraphs 7 or 10,
the purchase price shall be paid
(i)
(ii)

In cash;
A down payment equal to the federal estate

tax imposed on the value of the stock included in Webb's
estate for federal estate tax purposes based on the average
tax rate imposed on such estate.

The balance shall be paid

as provided in paragraph (c)(ii) above; or
(iii)

Upon such other terms as may be agreed to by

the parties.
13.

Legend on Certificates.

All Stock whether now owned

or hereafter acquired by any party to this Agreement shall be
subject to the provisions of this Agreement, and all certificates
representing the Stock shall bear the following legend:
The shares represented by this Certificate are subject to and
transferable only on compliance with an Agreement dated
between the Corporation and its
shareholders, a copy of which is on file at the offices of the
Corporation.
14.

Voting Agreement.
14.1

Voting Agreement Until August 1, 1986.

The

Stockholders hereby agree to vote their Stock at all meetings of
the Stockholders until August 1, 1986, the death of Roland Webb
or Reagan, or the termination of this Agreement under paragraph
15 whichever is sooner, as follows:
(a)

To elect Reagan, Norm Clark, or such other

person that is designated by Reagan, Webb, Duanne C.
Karren, or such other person that is designated by Webb,
and Gerald Gray, or such other person that is mutually
agreed upon by Reagan and Webb as members of the Board of
Directors.

All transactions between the Corporation and a

Shareholder, except as provided in (b) (cl and (d) below,
shall be subject to approval by such Board of Directors.
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(b)

To have the Corporation enter into

employment agreements with Reagan and Webb upon the terms
set out in the agreements attached hereto as Exhibits A and

(c)

To have the Corporation sell real property,

more particularly described on Exhibit C attached hereto,
to Webb Investment for $548,310.
(d)

To have the Corporation lease real property,

more particularly described on Exhibit D attached hereto,
under a lease substantially the same as Exhibit E, attached
hereto.
14

-2

Voting Agreement After August 1, 1986.

The

Stockholders hereby agree to vote their stock at all meetings of
the Stockholders after August 1, 1986 to elect Roland Webb as a
director so long as he owns Stock or until the death of Roland
Webb or Reagan or the termination of this Agreement.
15.

Termination.

This Agreement and all rights and

duties provided for hereunder shall terminate upon the occurrence of
any of the following events:
(a)

The bankruptcy or dissolution of the Corporation;

(b)

A single Stockholder becoming the owner of all

Stock of the Corporation which is then subject to this Agreement;
(c)

Execution of a written instrument by the holders

of all of the Stock outstanding which terminates this Agreement.
The termination of this Agreement for any reason shall not
affect any right or remedy existing hereunder prior to the effective
date of such termination.
16.

Rights of Ownership.

The Stockholders shall retain

all their rights as stockholders of the Corporation, except those
specifically modified by this Agreement.
17.

Subchapter S Election.
17.1

It is the desire and intention of the

Corporation and each of the Stockholders that the Corporation
should make a Subchapter S election under the United States
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Internal Revenue Code 1954, as amended, and should terminate and
revoke any such election once made only in accordance with the
determination of the holders of a majority of all the
outstanding stock of the Corporation,
17.2

In order to protect any Subchapter S election

made by the Corporation and to prevent its inadvertent
termination by transfer of any stock of the Corporation into the
hands of more than fifteen shareholders or an unqualified or
nonconsenting shareholder, the Stockholders, intending to
legally bind themselves, their successors, executors,
administrators, heirs and assigns, hereby agree as follows; and
agree that they will vote their shares, execute necessary
documents, take other required action, and otherwise exert their
best efforts at all times in good faith to accomplish the
following objectives:
(a)

If the holders of a majority of all

outstanding stock of the Corporation at any time determine
that it will be in the best interest of the Corporation and
its shareholders to make an election, or to terminate or
revoke an election, under Subchapter S of the United States
Internal Revenue Code, (i) the Corporation agrees that it
will make such election by timely filing of Form 2553 or
other appropriate form and supporting documents, and to
terminate or revoke such election and (ii) the Stockholders
agree that each will give his written consent thereto in
such form and manner and execute all documents and take
such other action as may be necessary or adviseable to
effectuate such determination.

If any document evidencing

such consent or other action is required for filing or
other purposes under the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code or otherwise in order to effectuate such
determination, and any shareholder is unable or otherwise
fails to execute such document or take such other action in
due and timely manner, then Stockholder hereby appoints the
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Secretary of the Corporation to be his attorney-in-fac:fc to
execute such document and to take all other action in
place and 6tead which may be necessary or advisable

nIS

td

effectuate such determination.
(b)

No Stockholder will sell, assign or t r * n s * e r

any of his shares of the Corporation to any person or

ln

any manner which would cause a Subchapter S election
theretofore made by the Corporation to be terminated <?r
revoked, without the prior consent by vote or in writ£ n 9 °f
the holders of a majority in interest of all the
outstanding stock of the Corporation.
18
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Notices.

All notices provided for by this Agreement

shall be made in writing either by actual delivery of the notice
into the hands of the party entitled thereto or by mailing the
notice in the United States mails to the last known address as shown
on the records of the Corporation, of the party entitled thereto*
certified mail, return receipt requested.

In either case, such

notice shall be deemed to be given and received upon its actual
receipt by the party entitled thereto.
19.

Closing Date.

The Closing Date shall be August 1/

20.

Condition Precedent.

19B1.
The obligations of all the

parties to this Agreement are subject to the Closing of the purchase
by the Corporation of at least eighty percent of the outstanding
stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc.
21.

Genearl Provisions.
21.1

Remedies for Breach.

The Stock is a unique

chattel and each party to this Agreement shall have the remedies
which are available to him, her or it for the violation of any
of the terms of this Agreement, including, but not limited to,
the equitable remedy of specific performance.
21.2

Descriptive Headings.

Titles to paragraphs are

for information purposes only.
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21.3

Successors, etc.

Except as hereinabove

expressly provided otherwise, this Agreement shall bind and
inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective
heirs, distributees, executors, administrators, successors
(including, without limitations, guardians, conservators, or
trustees in bankruptcy) and assigns; but nothing herein shall be
construed as an authorization of any party to assign or delegate
his rights or obligations hereunder.

Each Stockholder by the

signing hereof directs his or her personal representative to
open their estates promptly in the courts of proper jurisdiction
and to execute, procure and deliver all documents, including,
but not limited to, appropriate orders of court, and estate and
inheritance tax waivers, as may be required to effectuate the
purposes of this Agreement.
21.4

Invalid Provision.

The invalidity or

unenforceability of any particular provision of this Agreement
shall not affect the other provisions hereof, and the Agreement
shall be construed in all respects as if such invalid or
unenforceable provisions were bm-itted.
21.5

Governing Law.

This Agreement shall be

construed pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah then in
effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this
Agreement as of the day and year first above written.
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC.
Attest:

v£SL
s*»c*ri»hary
William K. R e a g a n ^ / /

•'Roland Webb

3essie P. Webb
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